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BETWEEN ACCESS AND
INFLUENCE:
BUILDING A RECORD FOR THE
NEXT COURT
RENATA E. B. STRAUSE & DANIEL P. TOKAJI
This Article considers the evidence that should be collected and
developed to support the next generation of reforms before a future
Supreme Court. It discusses but ultimately sidesteps theoretical debates
over rationales for reform, focusing instead on the practical questions
likely to face future policymakers, lawyers, and expert witnesses.
Drilling down into the ample evidentiary record in McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission, we address the types of evidence that
should be amassed by supporters of future regulation. This evidentiary
record, we suggest, will be essential in both formulating the next
generation of campaign finance reform and in defending it in court. We
argue that, regardless of whether one favors an anti-corruption or
egalitarian rationale for regulation, the evidentiary record should focus
on conflicts of interest—in particular, on whether a reasonable
legislator would feel pressure to act in way that is different from the
preferences of her constituents or the public interest. This is something
more than a showing of unequal access, but something less than a
showing of actual influence on policymaking. In the near term, our
suggestions are designed to help define a research agenda for
qualitative and quantitative empirical researchers. In the long term, they
offer a roadmap for the legislators shaping and the lawyers defending
future regulations before a Supreme Court less reflexively antagonistic
to reform than the current one.

Copyright © 2014 Renata E. B. Strause & Daniel P. Tokaji.
 Daniel P. Tokaji is the Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Professor of
Constitutional Law at The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law.
 Renata E. B. Strause is a graduate of Yale Law School and Oberlin College.

STRAUSETOKAI 10.24.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

180

12/20/2014 4:34 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9:1

INTRODUCTION
A persistent feature of campaign finance discourse has been
disagreement over rationales for regulation. Proponents and
opponents of reform have tangled repeatedly with each other, often in
caustic terms, over whether there are any good reasons for public
financing, disclosure requirements, restrictions on expenditures and
contributions. The debate among reform-minded scholars and
advocates has been almost as fervent. Particularly unrelenting, no
doubt interminably so to some observers, is the longstanding debate
over whether regulation should be aimed at preventing corruption or
promoting equality.
With the Roberts Court having emphatically rejected egalitarian
rationales and having severely constricted the anti-corruption
rationale, this debate is now largely academic—not in a bad sense, but
in the sense of being mostly of interest to academics. Five justices
firmly adhere to a narrow conception of corruption, limited to quid
pro quo transactions. To the extent that there has been any lingering
doubt about the majority’s narrow conception of corruption,
1
2
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission definitively resolved it.
There is no good reason to believe that the five justices in the
majority will change their minds. Thus, as long as the current Court
sits, we should not expect to see any significant change in the
constitutional law surrounding campaign finance regulation. The anticorruption rationale will remain narrow, and the equality rationale
will be off the table. As long as that remains the case, the options
available to reform-minded advocates will be extremely limited.
While not denying the importance of theoretical debates over the
rationales for regulation, for two reasons we think it is more
important to focus attention on the evidence that should be amassed
to support the next generation of campaign finance reform. First,
examination of the effects of money on the political process—
including the independent expenditures flooding the system since
3
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission —will be essential in
shaping the next generation of campaign finance reforms and
shepherding them through the legislative process. Second,
documentation of these effects will be necessary in defending these
1. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
2. Id. at 1441 (“Any regulation must instead target what we have called ‘quid pro quo’
corruption or its appearance.”).
3. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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reforms in court. Even if the Court’s composition shifts, such that
there is no longer a majority hostile to campaign finance regulation,
the Court is unlikely to give a blank check to legislators in regulating
campaign money—nor do we think it should, given concerns
regarding free speech and entrenchment. The evidence amassed in
support of regulation will therefore be essential not only in crafting
legislation, but also in demonstrating that legislation is appropriately
tailored.
This article therefore considers the evidence that should be
collected and developed to support the next generation of reforms
before a future Supreme Court. It discusses but ultimately sidesteps
theoretical debates over rationales for reform, focusing instead on the
practical questions likely to be faced by future policymakers, lawyers,
and expert witnesses. Drilling down into the ample evidentiary record
4
in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, we address the types
of evidence that should be amassed by supporters of future
regulation. This evidentiary record, we suggest, will be essential both
in formulating the next generation of campaign finance reforms and
in defending it in court. The recent plurality and dissenting opinions in
McCutcheon highlight the pressing need for such evidence with
respect to the current federal campaign finance system.
We argue that, regardless of whether one favors an anticorruption or egalitarian rationale for regulation, the evidentiary
record should focus on conflicts of interest—in particular, on whether
a reasonable legislator would feel pressure to act in a way that is
different from the preferences of her constituents or the public
interest. This is something more than a showing of unequal access, but
something less than a showing of actual influence on policymaking. In
the near term, our suggestions are designed to help define a research
agenda for qualitative and quantitative empirical researchers. In the
long term, they offer a roadmap for legislators and lawyers to shape
and defend future regulations before a Supreme Court that is less
reflexively antagonistic to reform than the current one.
The article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the rationales for
regulation accepted and rejected by the Supreme Court over time,
focusing especially on the shifting anti-corruption rationale. Part II
canvasses the academic debate over the justifications for regulation,
including current and prior iterations of the equality versus anti4. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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corruption debate. We draw from this debate the lesson that,
regardless of one’s underlying conception of the values properly
served by reform, reformers should focus on conflicts of interest in
amassing an evidentiary record. Part III traces this notion through a
close examination of the evidentiary record developed in support of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) for McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission. Part V sketches the sort of evidence
that ought to be developed for the next Court, focusing on how
independent expenditures create conflicts of interest in the legislative
process.
I. THE SHIFTING ANTI-CORRUPTION RATIONALE
We start by canvassing the rationales for regulation that have
been accepted and rejected by the Supreme Court. On a superficial
level, the Court has been consistent in accepting the prevention of
corruption and appearance of corruption as rationales that justify
regulation, while rejecting the promotion of equality. In reality, the
anti-corruption rationale has been an accordion in the Court’s hands,
starting off narrow, then broadening in cases like Austin v. Michigan
5
Chamber of Commerce and McConnell, only to contract again in the
hands of the Roberts Court.
The story of modern campaign finance doctrine begins with 1976’s
6
Buckley v. Valeo. In reviewing the 1974 Amendments to the Federal
7
Election Campaign Act (FECA), the Supreme Court set the
constitutional parameters for the regulation of money in politics. First,
contributions and expenditures differ in the degree of First
8
Amendment protection they enjoy. Second, restrictions on either
9
must be justified in terms of anti-corruption, not equality.
5. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
8. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23 (“[A]lthough the Act's contribution and expenditure
limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings
impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and
association than do its limitations on financial contributions.”). At the risk of oversimplification, the distinction between contributions and expenditures is essentially this: a
contribution is money given to a candidate or party or political action committee; an
expenditure is money directly spent on advertising or staff time or for any other political good,
in order to benefit a candidate, party, or political action.
9. See id. at 54 (“The ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of
candidates competing for elective office . . . is clearly not sufficient to justify the provision’s
infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.”).
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The reasoning behind Buckley’s contribution-expenditure
distinction was twofold. First, the Court concluded that there was a
difference between the First Amendment interests implicated by
contributions and those implicated by expenditures. While
contribution limitations impose “only a marginal restriction upon the
10
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication,” restrictions
on expenditures “impose direct and substantial restraints on the
11
quantity of political speech.” A contribution to a candidate or group
generally expresses support for the recipient, but neither conveys the
contributor’s reasons nor equates the amount given with any quantity
12
of speech. The “primary First Amendment concern” raised by
restricting contributions is therefore not the contributor’s free speech
13
rights but rather her freedom of association. To be constitutional,
such a restriction need only be justified by an important
governmental interest and closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
14
interference with the contributor’s associational rights. The Court
15
later clarified that this is something less than strict scrutiny. By
contrast, direct expenditures on campaign communications—whether
by a candidate, an individual, or an interest group—fund the
“[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates [that] are integral to the operation” of our system of
16
government. Limitations on expenditures restrict that discussion by
reducing “the number of issues . . . , the depth of their exploration, and
17
the size of the audience reached.” Thus, they face more exacting
18
scrutiny.
The second reason for Buckley’s distinction between contributions
and expenditures concerned the government’s interest in regulation.
The Court found that the contribution limits, but not expenditure
limits, could be justified by an interest in preventing corruption and its
appearance. Three interests were offered to justify the FECA
amendments’ restriction on contributions: prevention of corruption
and the appearance of corruption; equalization of citizens’ relative
ability to influence electoral outcomes; and curbing the increasing
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 19.
See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 386 (discussing the standards of review used in Buckley).
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19

costs of political campaigns. The Buckley Court found the threat of
actual or apparent corruption sufficient to justify contribution limits,
20
obviating the need to address the other two interests.
The Court engaged in a more extensive discussion of the interests
supporting regulation in connection with the FECA amendments’
21
expenditure restrictions. After construing the statutory language of
the $1,000 expenditure cap to avoid vagueness problems—in what
would come to be known as the “magic words” test for express
22
advocacy —Buckley rejected the argument that the expenditure
limits could be justified as a means to “maximize[e] the effectiveness
23
of the less intrusive contribution limitations.” It also held the anticorruption interest inadequate to support expenditure limits. The
Court found that expenditures made “totally independently of the
24
candidate and his campaign” gave rise to “substantially diminished
25
potential for abuse”; the lack of coordination eliminated the
possibility of a quid pro quo.
After rejecting anti-circumvention and anti-corruption as interests
that could support expenditure limits, the Buckley Court turned to
what it called “the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of
26
elections.” The government characterized this as an interest in
democratizing federal elections by lessening the “disproportionate
27
advantage, the distorting effect, of wealthy special interest groups.”
The Court rejected this rationale in emphatic and sweeping terms,
labelling it “wholly foreign to the First Amendment” to limit the
28
speech of some to enhance the relative voice of others.

19. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25–26.
20. Id. at 26–27.
21. The Amendment set a $1,000 annual ceiling on expenditures “relative to a clearlyidentified candidate” for individuals and groups other than parties with candidates on the ballot,
their campaigns, and political parties. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 §608(a)–(e) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.).
22. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
23. Id. at 44.
24. Id. at 47.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 48.
27. Brief for the Att’y Gen. and the FEC at 23, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Nos.
75-436, 75-437), 1975 WL 171459 at *23.
28. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49.
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The consequence of Buckley was that individual contribution
limits could be justified on anti-corruption grounds, while limits on
individual expenditures could not be justified by this or any other
interest. Less clear in Buckley’s wake was precisely what was meant
by an anti-corruption interest and whether an understanding of
corruption that went beyond quid pro quo might suffice to uphold
regulations on expenditures. It is within that doctrinal space that the
Supreme Court’s accordion expanded and contracted in subsequent
years.
The most notable expansion of the anti-corruption rationale was
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 1990 opinion for the Court in Austin v.
29
Michigan Chamber of Commerce. In that case, the Court upheld a
Michigan law prohibiting corporations from using general treasury
funds to make independent expenditures in support of or in
30
opposition to candidates for state office. While purporting to rely on
an anti-corruption rationale, Austin’s version of that rationale was
quite different from the one articulated in Buckley. The justification
embraced in Austin was not the avoidance of quid pro quo corruption
or its appearance, but rather the prevention of a “different type of
31
corruption in the political arena,” namely “the corrosive and
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little
or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political
32
ideas.” Rejecting the characterization of the Michigan law in Justice
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion—that the law was aimed at
33
“equaliz[ing] the relative influence of speakers on elections,” —the
Court found instead that the law ensured that “expenditures reflect
actual public support for the political ideas espoused by
34
corporations.” Notwithstanding this disclaimer, some scholars
(including one of the authors) have understood Austin as implicitly
embracing an egalitarian rationale for campaign spending
35
restrictions.

29. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
30. Id. at 654 (citing Michigan Campaign Finance Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §169.251, sec.
51(1) (1979)).
31. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 660.
35. Daniel P. Tokaji, The Obliteration of Equality in American Campaign Finance Law: A
Trans-Border Comparison, 5 J. PARL. & POL. L. 381 (2011).
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A decade after Austin, the Court again considered and upheld a
state law restricting campaign money, this time in the form of
36
individual contribution limits passed by the Missouri Legislature.
37
The Court’s decision in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
clarified the level of scrutiny applicable to low contribution limits,
38
including the quantum of evidence necessary to uphold them. Its
main relevance here is in the Court’s explication of what counts as
corruption. According to the Shrink Missouri Court, corruption is
“not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the
broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large
39
contributors.” Shrink Missouri made clear that “in addition to ‘quid
40
pro quo arrangements,’” the anti-corruption interest encompassed
“improper influence” and “opportunities for abuse” and was
sufficiently compelling for Congress to “address the power of money
‘to influence governmental action’ in ways less ‘blatant and specific’
41
than bribery.” Beyond the governmental interest in preventing
actual corruption, Shrink Missouri also breathed new life into
Buckley’s interest in preventing the appearance of corruption,
warning: “Leave the perception of impropriety unanswered, and the
cynical assumption that large donors call the tune could jeopardize
42
the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance.”
The Court further refined this expansive view of corruption in its
43
decision in McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission, which
upheld most of Congress’s revamping of federal campaign finance
law, embodied in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
44
(BCRA). We address the evidentiary record before the McConnell
45
Court in detail below, but for present purposes, the critical point is its
broad conception of the anti-corruption rationale. The McConnell
plaintiffs argued that, “without concrete evidence of an instance in
which a federal officeholder . . . actually switched a vote . . . Congress
36. MO. ANN. STAT. § 130.032.1(1) (West 2008), repealed by S.B. 1038, 2008 Leg., (Mo.
2008)).
37. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
38. See id. at 384 (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s reversal of the District Court’s summary
judgment ruling).
39. Id. at 389.
40. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 390.
43. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
44. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified
primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C).
45. See section IV infra.
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has not shown that there exists real or apparent corruption.” The
Court responded on both the facts and the law, noting that the
“evidence connects soft money to manipulations of the legislative
47
calendar” in the form of congressional failure to act, and that Court
precedent “firmly established that Congress’ legitimate interest
48
extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption.” The
corruption Congress could aim at was not as narrow as the quid pro
quo the plaintiffs described, but instead encompassed “undue
influence on an office holder’s judgment, and the appearance of such
49
influence.” The evidence that large donors enjoyed special access
and influence was therefore sufficient to justify BCRA’s ban on soft
money. Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing that the anticorruption
rationale articulated in Buckley could only support Congress’s power
to regulate “federal candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of quids,
whether or not the candidate or officeholder corruptly received
50
them.”
The arrival of the Roberts Court provided a majority for Justice
Kennedy’s narrower reading—what the McConnell majority called a
51
52
“crabbed view” of the anti-corruption rationale. While Citizens
United is probably best known for its recognition of corporate speech
rights, this aspect of the ruling was really nothing new. The truly
significant change in law wrought by Citizens United was its
redefinition of the anti-corruption rationale. In striking down BCRA’s
53
ban on corporate electioneering communications, Citizens United
explicitly overruled Austin’s holding that anti-distortion was a form of
54
corruption that could support restrictions on corporate expenditures.
The Court viewed the corruption-as-antidistortion rationale as
antithetical to the principle that government has no interest “in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence

46. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149.
47. Id. at 150.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 441
(2001)).
50. Id. at 294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 152.
52. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Chief Justice Rehnquist, who voted with
the majority in Austin passed away in 2005 and was replaced by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice O’Connor, a co-author of the majority opinion as to Titles I and II in McConnell retired
in 2006 and was replaced by Justice Alito.
53. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West 2014).
54. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350.
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55

the outcome of elections.” According to the Citizens United majority,
the only interest that could justify restrictions on campaign money
56
was the prevention of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. As
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court put it: “That speakers may
have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that
those officials are corrupt. And the appearance of influence or access
57
will not cause the electorate to lose faith in this democracy.” Citizens
United thus narrowed the definition of corruption, rejecting the
broader understanding embraced in Shrink Missouri and McConnell
and purporting to settle the debate once and for all.
If any doubt remained about the Roberts Court’s approach to
campaign finance law in the wake of Citizens United, it was laid to rest
58
in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. The Court struck
down aggregate caps on contributions—limits on how much an
individual could give to all federal candidates and political
59
committees combined. Aggregate limits were first established in
60
FECA and were upheld in Buckley. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
for the McCutcheon plurality doubled down on Citizens United’s
narrow understanding of corruption: “[W]hile preventing corruption
or its appearance is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a
specific type of corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”McCutcheon
thus makes it unmistakably clear that corruption means the quid pro
quo exchange of money for political favors. It made no difference that
the law reviewed in McCutcheon restricted contributions, which are
formally subject to a lower level of scrutiny than expenditure
restrictions. Thus, contribution limits may be justified before the
Roberts Court if they are closely drawn to prevent the reality or
appearance of quid pro quo corruption. Disparities of access and
influence are simply beside the point.
II. THE ACADEMIC DEBATE
Debates over the constitutionally permissible and tactically
preferable rationales for regulating money in politics rage on,
notwithstanding the turn taken by the Roberts Court. The debate is

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)).
Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
Id. at 1442.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.
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particularly active among supporters of reform. The current
incarnation centers around a conception of corruption put forward by
Professor Lawrence Lessig in his 2011 book Republic Lost and the
61
historical research by Professor Zephyr Teachout. Professor Lessig
advances an argument based on “dependence corruption,” which he
claims is mandated by an originalist view of the Constitution.
Professor Richard Hasen has criticized Lessig’s proposed rationale,
particularly his contention that dependence corruption is distinct
from equality. As vigorous as the current debate has been, it is hardly
the first time that reform-friendly scholars have debated the relative
merits of anti-corruption and equality as rationales for reform. In this
Part, we summarize the current debate as well as its earlier
incarnation in the scholarship of Professors Daniel Lowenstein, Bruce
Cain, and David Strauss almost two decades ago. We take no side in
the recurrent debate over whether reformers should couch their
arguments in terms of preventing corruption or promoting equality.
Our goal, instead, is to examine these rationales with an eye toward
developing the evidence that might support them before a future
Court less hostile to regulation than the current one.
A. Is Dependence Corruption Really Equality?
Professors Lessig and Teachout are the leading exponents of a
broader anti-corruption rationale in the current debate. Teachout
excavates a free-standing anti-corruption principle embedded in the
Constitution’s history and text which, like federalism or the
separation of powers principle, should be given independent weight in
62
constitutional contests. Her review of the Constitution’s text and the
debates surrounding its creation produce evidence that the Framers
63
were “centrally focused on corruption,” and that they commonly
understood corruption in terms reaching beyond the narrow crime of
64
bribery to the “self-serving use of public power for private ends.”
Teachout criticizes the Court’s case law on corruption in the political
process as chaotic—undecided among five different conceptions of
the problem—and argues that it should instead be “tethered to both
65
the past and the present as an evolving standard,” much like the
understanding of “cruel and unusual punishment” for Eighth
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009).
Id. at 373 n.156.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 411.
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Amendment purposes.
Building on Teachout’s work, Lessig proposes a “new” conception
of corruption, which he characterizes as “the state of an institution or
an individual that has developed a dependence different from a, or
66
the, dependence intended or desired.” We say “new,” quotation
marks and all, because central to Lessig’s legal argument is that the
understanding of corruption he proposes is not new at all, but rather
that which the Framers understood and imbued in constitutional text
and structure. Rather than the ordinary meaning of corruption, in
which bad-acting individuals engage in a quid pro quo, or even an
aggregation of instances of quid pro quo corruption, dependence
corruption means an institution has been drawn away from its
67
intended course. In the case of Congress, the Framers’ intended
course was a dependence “upon the People alone,” enforced by
biennial elections in the House, by restrictions on executive
appointments, and by blocking foreign gifts to government officials,
68
among other provisions. Although he describes numerous ways in
69
which Congress might be “dependence-corrupt,” the deviation from
Congress’s intended dependence of greatest concern to Lessig is the
70
importance of “the funders.” In order to run for office—or, perhaps
more precisely, in order to compete—a candidate must first receive
the support of the small percentage of Americans who contribute
money to political campaigns, in what Lessig calls the “funding
71
election.”
For Lessig, corruption inheres in representatives’ dependence
upon funders not because of a contemporary moral judgment about
the propriety of a private financing system or the aggregations of
72
wealth, but because the Framers’ judgment in favor of the exclusivity
of “the People.” Dependence on the funders is “corrupt” because it
conflicts with the dependence on the People alone contemplated by
66. Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 61, 65 (2013).
67. LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST 226, 231 (2011).
68. Id. at 129–31. See also Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor Lawrence Lessig in Support of
Appellee, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No. 12-536), 2013 WL 3874388.
69. See Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean,
102 CAL. L. REV. 1, 15–19 (2014) (discussing a hypothetical “federalism primary” in which a
state senate would choose the candidates for the general election for the state assembly—and
therefore also the congressional candidates—and the White Primary Cases and United States v.
Classic).
70. Lessig, Reply to Hasen, supra note 66, at 232–33.
71. LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST, supra note 67, at 3–4.
72. See id. at 11.
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73

the Framers. That conflict of interest, Lessig argues, is the disease.
The symptoms appear in the way that the improper dependence of
representatives on funders “qualifies the democracy” by producing “a
subtle, understated, perhaps camouflaged bending to keep the funders
74
in the money elections happy.” Lessig argues that dependence
corruption is an alteration to the original design of a particular
ecosystem of influence. It is thus distinct not only from equality but
also from corruption-as-bribery.
Professor Hasen takes issue with Lessig’s dependence corruption
rationale, particularly the claim that it is really distinct from the
75
equality-based rationale rejected in Citizens United. Hasen views
dependence corruption as ultimately animated by a concern for
76
inequality, as was the anti-distortion rationale of Austin.
Dependence corruption “seeks to justify campaign finance laws on
grounds that the laws distribute power fairly and correct a distortion
77
present in an unregulated (or less regulated) system.” The distortion
is the outsized influence of “the funders” over legislative outcomes
78
relative to any popular support for their objectives. Lessig rejects the
equality characterization, but Hasen finds further proof in Lessig’s
79
central reform proposal: a voucher system. Legislators would still be
dependent upon a subset of “the People,” namely those citizens whose
vouchers they received, but because the unequal distribution of
wealth is no longer a factor, the resulting skew is no longer a
80
problem.
B. Equality, Corruption, and Conflicts of Interest
Perhaps everything that seems new really is old. A previous
incarnation of the debate over the relationship between corruption
and equality took place on the pages of the University of Chicago

73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 4.
75. Hasen and other scholars have also questioned Lessig’s originalist interpretation,
although that angle of the debate is beyond our purposes here. See Richard L. Hasen, Is
“Dependence Corruption” Distinct From a Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance
Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L. J. 305 (2013); Seth Barrett Tillman, Why
Professor Lessig’s “Dependence Corruption” Is Not a Founding-Era Concept, 13 ELECTION L. J.
336 (2014).
76. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. REV. 550, 572 (2012).
77. Hasen, supra note 75, at 311.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Legal Forum in 1995. In that round, Professors David Strauss and
Bruce Cain took up the equality charge, responding to Professor
Daniel Lowenstein’s thoughtful meditations on corruption published
81
a few years earlier.
Professor Lowenstein’s approach bears more than a passing
resemblance to the argument that Lessig has more recently made,
albeit to a much broader audience. Lowenstein viewed corruption as
an “essentially contested concept” in need of an intermediate theory
82
of politics to explain the desired, uncorrupted baseline. Lowenstein
sought to reconcile a legislative process “tainted with corruption”
with the recognition that both legislators and lobbyists “by and large,
83
are not corrupt.” Where Lessig found an originalist answer, seeing
the problem as a deviation from the Framers’ intended dependence,
84
Lowenstein saw the problem functionally—as a conflict of interest.
Taking on the perception of some campaign finance reformers
that campaign contributions buy influence with elected officials,
Lowenstein observed that the empirical research on the claim was
mixed, though in part by taking a too-narrow view of the legislative
85
process. The lack of hard empirical evidence did not, for Lowenstein,
support the conclusion by many analysts that “concern over
contributions may be minimized” because of the complexity of
86
intertwined interests influencing legislative behavior. The problem
was not that campaign contributions were obviously the dominant
force, nor was it that they were one insignificant wave in a sea of
competing pressures, but that their presence created a conflict of
interest for the recipient legislator. The conflict for legislators “exists
when the consequences of a decision made in the course of a
relationship of trust are likely to have an effect, not implicit in the
87
trust relationship, on . . . the decisionmaker’s self-interest.” The
88
relationship of trust, for Lowenstein, was “ethically significant,”
similar to a fiduciary relationship, and policing the conflicts requires
81. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics,
32 UCLA L. REV. 784 (1985); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The
Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989).
82. Lowenstein, Political Bribery, supra note 81, at 851.
83. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 81, at 335.
84. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Lowenstein Contra Lowenstein: Conflicts of Interest in Election
Administration, 9 ELECTION L.J. 421 (2010).
85. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 81, at 322–23.
86. Id. at 323.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 323 n.100.
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looking to their effect on the average person, not one unusually
89
susceptible to or resistant to acting in self-interest.
Lowenstein’s conflict of interest conception recognized that it
would be impossible to isolate campaign contributions as the reason a
legislator’s position moves on a particular issue. An issue arises
against the backdrop of a complex array of considerations, including
party platforms, the merits of the issue, constituency concerns, and the
legislator’s knowledge of past contributions and expectations of
future contributions. This background forms a legislator’s initial
predisposition, which may be modified by any kind of new
information, but even the way the new information is processed by
90
the legislator is influenced by the original predisposition. A
contribution may provide this new information and it “may or may
not affect the legislator’s ultimate actions, but setting aside the most
flagrant cases, no one can be sure, perhaps not even the legislator in
91
question.” For this reason, Lowenstein argued the best way to
understand the contribution’s effect on the legislative process was as a
“taint”; like a drop of food coloring in a bowl of clear water, the
92
contribution is “intermingled . . . in a way that cannot be isolated.”
Importantly, it is the comingling and not the change to the
external appearance that represents the conflict for Lowenstein. He
drew a distinction between a conflict of interest and an appearance of
impropriety, finding a focus on appearances to be misleading: “It
suggests that there is an underlying reality that is either proper or not
proper, and if we could only look behind a locked door or, perhaps,
93
into the legislator’s head, we would know.” For a conflict of interest
approach, it does not matter that there was almost certainly never a
moment behind a closed door when the legislator decided whether or
not to succumb to the wishes of her donors; the problem is that the
94
outcome results from an actual, tainted process. Thus, the rationale
for campaign finance regulation is best conceived as addressing the
reality of conflicts of interest rather than the appearance of
corruption.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 324.
Id. at 324–25.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id. at 326.
Id.
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Like Professor Lessig in the current debate, Professor Lowenstein
was met with the argument that his anti-corruption argument was
really grounded in egalitarian concerns. For Professor Cain,
preventing conflicts of interest was a “defensible basis [for campaign
finance regulation] for those who equate representation with legal
trusteeship or those who find ethical formulations of democracy
95
persuasive,” but offered no assistance to those who see democracy as
96
defined procedurally. Under the latter approach, the greatest
concerns are that individuals have sufficient information to make
97
informed choices; that the choices reflect autonomous, un-coerced
98
preferences; and that democratic structures are concerned with
99
equity of participation, influence, and outcome. Regulation of
campaign money may affect any or all of these concerns, but the kinds
of proposals aimed at limiting the corrupting influence of large or
improperly-sourced contributions are primarily rooted in a desire to
enhance equality.
Professor Strauss questioned the conventional treatment of
100
corruption and inequality as distinct problems. He offered as a
thought experiment a world in which everyone has an exactly equal
opportunity to contribute to a legislator and, in exchange, receive
101
some desired legislative action. Without equality as a concern, the
exchange loses its corrupt flavor. In fact, he proposed, there may be
ways in which responsiveness to campaign contributions (in the
hypothetical world of perfect equality) may be more democratic than
the ways representatives respond to voters, specifically in the ability
to express intensity and to disaggregate a legislator’s many positions
102
for approval or disapproval. Strauss ultimately concludes that
equality is the core concern of campaign finance reform efforts and
103
likely the one easiest to justify, although not without its own
problems as a rationale, particularly whether the political system can

95. Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 111, 122.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 126.
98. Id. at 123.
99. Id. at 135–38.
100. David A. Strauss, What Is The Goal Of Campaign Finance Reform?, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 141, 142 .
101. Id. at 143–44; see also David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance
Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1373–75 (1994).
102. Strauss, Goal of Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 100, at 144–45.
103. Id. at 158.
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be trusted with it and whether it is ultimately worth the cost.
Strauss’s argument bears a strong resemblance to that which Hasen
has recently advanced. Both contend that a broad anti-corruption
105
rationale is rooted in a theory of political equality.
Our goal in this Part has been to summarize the academic debate
over anti-corruption and equality rationales in its present and
previous incarnations. We do not take a position on whether the
ultimate goal of regulation is best conceived of as promoting equality
or preventing corruption. In fact, we think that what unifies these
approaches to reform is more important than what separates them.
Whether one favors the anti-corruption or equality rationale, conflicts
of interest are a serious problem. From an anti-corruption standpoint,
conflicts of interest taint the political process, potentially diverting
legislators from their responsibility to serve their constituents’
interests or the public interest. From an egalitarian standpoint,
conflicts of interest are a problem because they contravene the basic
principle that all citizens should have equal influence on politics,
regardless of wealth. Thus, while not denying that something
meaningful is at stake in the theoretical debate over which rationale
to develop and argue before a future Supreme Court, we think a far
more important question asks what type of evidence should be
developed to document conflicts of interest arising from the existing
system of campaign finance. It is to this question that we now turn,
focusing on the types of evidence developed in past cases—most
notably, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, which included
the most extensive record in any case to date.
III. THE PREVIOUS RECORD: MCCONNELL
Any good theory of politics should ultimately confront on-theground reality. We do not know whether a future Supreme Court,
more sympathetic to reform than the current one, will prefer an
equality-based rationale to an anti-corruption rationale for campaign
finance reform. We do know, however, that reformers will have the
burden of developing a factual record for both legislation and
litigation. Evidence regarding conflicts of interest in our current
system will be vital to shaping appropriate regulations and
shepherding them through the legislative process. And ultimately, that

104. Id. at 158–59; see also Strauss, Corruption, supra note 101, at 1383–88.
105. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 76.
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evidence will be vital in defending those reforms in court. This creates
a challenge for proponents of reform, including social scientists and
lawyers, given the uncertainty about which rationales will be
acceptable to the next Court.
To determine what evidence should be developed for future
legislation and litigation, we look back. Without question, the most
expansive evidentiary record created to date in a campaign finance
case is the one developed in McConnell v. Federal Election
106
Commission. The Supreme Court considered a consolidated case
made up of eleven separate lawsuits filed by a total of seventy-seven
plaintiffs, who had, along with the government and dozens of
defendant-intervenors, produced more than forty-one boxes of
evidentiary submissions containing the testimony and declarations of
107
over 200 witnesses and 100,000 pages of material. A three-judge
district court heard from twenty-four attorneys during nine hours of
108
oral arguments and read 1,676 pages of briefing by the parties alone.
Its complex ruling—which spanned four opinions, including a per
curiam on some sections of the law and an additional opinion by each
judge—required more than 774 pages, more than one-third of which
109
were dedicated to findings of fact. Here, we examine how the
Supreme Court used those factual findings to support some of its key
legal conclusions, drilling down to the specific pieces of evidence
relied on by the district court. A careful examination of the
McConnell record—both what it included and what it did not—is
helpful in considering what evidence should be developed for the next
generation of reforms. We categorize this evidence by subject, with
the primary factual findings on which the Court rested in italics,
followed by a description of the evidence supporting each finding.

106. Justice Breyer’s dissent in the recent McCutcheon decision reiterates this point,
reviewing some of the evidence produced in McConnell to support his broader view of
corruption. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1469–70 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 208–09 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
108. Id.
109. Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of Campaign Finance
Law, 3 ELECTION L. J. 147, 147 n.2, 166 n.131 (2004).
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1. Soft-money contributions to national party committees give rise
110
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.
The Court’s ultimate conclusion that BCRA’s soft-money
regulations were justified on anti-corruption grounds began with the
understanding that “contributions to a federal candidate’s party in aid
of that candidate’s campaign threaten to create—no less than would a
111
direct contribution to the candidate—a sense of obligation.” The
Court followed a multi-step path to get from that baseline, established
112
in Buckley, to its upholding of BCRA’s soft-money ban. First, the
Supreme Court found that the candidates, donors, and national party
113
committees had made use of the “soft-money loophole” to funnel
money raised outside of FECA’s source and amount restrictions
through the national parties for the benefit of particular campaigns.
The Supreme Court relied on the district court’s findings. Those
findings were in turn based on testimony from major donors,
lobbyists, party officials, and Members of Congress, as well as
evidence of the national party committees’ fundraising activities.
Those activities included keeping tallies of the money raised by
individual officeholders, distributing lists of party donors to
officeholders, and the use of joint fundraising committees.
The McConnell findings rested on multiple types of evidence.
Member testimony, for example, included both general statements
114
about the practice of raising soft money as well as specific testimony
115
relaying Members’ own experiences raising money. The evidence
110. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144–54 (2003). For each of the items discussed in this
section, we have provided a citation to the pages in McConnell where the Court’s conclusions
and factual discussions appear. We omit further citations to the Supreme Court decision within
each subsection and include citations to the opinions of the District Court judges.
111. Id. at 144.
112. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976) (upholding FECA’s limitation on party
contributions as a means of preventing circumvention of the $1,000 candidate contribution
limit).
113. Although “a literal reading of FECA’s definition of ‘contribution’” would have
required mixed federal/non-federal activities such as generic party advertising and get-out-thevote drives to be funded with hard money, a series of FEC decisions in the late 1970s allowed
political parties to use a mix of hard and soft money. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 123 n.7. Another
ruling by the FEC in 1995 further expanded the available uses of soft money by parties to fund
advertisements mentioning the name of a federal candidate, “so long as they did not expressly
advocate the candidate’s election or defeat.” Id. at 124.
114. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 471 (2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)
(quoting Declaration of Senator John McCain, “Soft money is often raised directly by federal
candidates and officeholders, and the largest amounts are often raised by the President, Vice
President and Congressional party leaders.”).
115. See, e.g., id. (quoting Declaration of former Senator Paul Simon, “While I was in
Congress, the DCCC [Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee] and the DSCC
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also included admissions in declarations by congressional party
committee officials that their committees “ask Members of Congress
to raise funds in specified amounts or to devote specified periods of
116
time to fundraising.” Corroborating documentary evidence was also
important, including solicitations from party committees linking the
potential donations to the re-election efforts of particular
officeholders as well as letters from donors indicating which Member
117
should get credit for donations to the party. There was also evidence
disputing assertions by plaintiffs that they did not use federal officials
118
to solicit major donors and, in the case of Senator McConnell, that
he was not aware of the donation history of individuals with whom he
119
met.
Another key finding was that soft-money donors often gave to
party committees not for ideological association and expression, but
rather because they were “seeking influence, or avoiding
120
retaliation.” On this point the Court relied on the testimony of
Robert Rozen, a lobbyist and partner at the firm of Washington
Council Ernst & Young who had experience organizing fundraisers
121
for federal candidates and advising clients on political contributions.
Rozen testified to the motivations of donors:
They give soft money because they believe that’s what helps
establish better contacts with members of Congress and gets doors
opened when they want to meet with Members. There is no
question that money creates the relationships. Companies with
interest before particular committees need to have access to the
[Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee] would ask Members to make phone calls seeking
contributions to the party. They would assign me a list of names, people I had not known
previously, and I would just go down the list. I am certain they did this because they found it
more effective to have Members make calls.”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 473 (citing, e.g., a letter soliciting donation to the National Republican Senatorial
Committee (NRSC) signed by Senator McConnell; letter from Republican National Committee
[RNC] contributor stating that “Congressman Scott McInnis deserve [sic] most of the
recruitment credit.”).
118. See id. at 474 (contrasting a statement by the RNC Finance Director that it was
“‘exceedingly rare’ for the RNC to rely on federal officeholders for personal or telephonic
solicitations of major donors” with a letter from the RNC Chairman to Senators asking to use
their names for a membership recruitment package and with handwritten notes divvying up lists
of donors among Members to call for solicitations).
119. See id. at 486–87 (comparing testimony of Senator McConnell with letter sent to a
contributor thanking him for a donation and specifically noting the handwritten addendum: “As
you may recall, any contributions to my ’02 campaign will count against your $25,000 annual
hard money limit in ’02 + not ’99. Hope you can help.”).
120. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 96, 148 (2003).
121. See id. at 147–48; McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 472 n.46, 492–93 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
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chairman of that committee, make donations, and go to events
where the chairman will be. Even if the chairman is not the type of
Member who will tie the contribution and the legislative goals
together, donors can’t be sure so they want to play it safe and
make soft money contributions. The large contributions enable
them to establish relationships, and that increases the chances
they’ll be successful with their public policy agenda. Compared to
the amounts that companies spend as a whole, large political
contributions are worthwhile because of the potential benefit to
122
the company’s bottom line.

The Court also found probative Rozen’s testimony as to the
response soft money donations elicited from Members of Congress:
You are doing a favor for somebody by making a large [soft
money] donation and they appreciate it. Ordinarily, people feel
inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for someone—
that is, write a larger check—and they feel even more compelled to
reciprocate. In my experience, overt words are rarely exchanged
123
about contributions, but people do have understandings.

According to this testimony, a sense of obligation was borne out of
the need to keep the financial well from running dry. As Rozen
further testified: “Too often, Members’ first thought is not what is
right or what they believe, but how it will affect fundraising. . . . When
you don’t pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never
124
get any more money from that piper.” Other current and former
Members’ testimony described, in general terms, the reasons donors
125
gave large amounts to political parties.
The Supreme Court found it “[p]articularly telling” that a majority
of top soft-money donors “gave substantial sums to both major
126
national parties,” showing that many donors’ motivations were to
127
secure access and influence. It rejected the Plaintiffs’ contention
that defendants were obligated to produce “concrete evidence of an
122. McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 492–93 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
123. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 147 (citing McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 493 (Kollar-Kotelly,
J.)).
124. Id. at 149 (quoting Declaration of former Senator Alan Simpson).
125. McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 490 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting testimony by former
Senators Rudman, Bumpers, Wirth, Brock, and Boren).
126. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 148.
127. The Court relied on findings from Judge Kollar-Kotelly, who in turn relied on a report
from Defendants’ expert Thomas Mann, corroborated by the testimony of a major corporate
donor and internal documents produced by Eli Lilly & Co. showing concern that the company’s
donations were lopsided to the Republican Party. McConnell, F.Supp.2d at 508–10 (KollarKotelly, J.).
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instance in which a federal officeholder has actually switched a vote
(or, presumably, evidence of a specific instance where the public
128
believes a vote was switched).” It was sufficient that the Defendants
introduced evidence of campaign contributions leading to access and
influence. For example, the Court compared the “deeply disturbing
129
examples’ of corruption” in Buckley, to the “similar examples of
national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and
130
officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations.” The
Court focused particularly on the “menus of opportunities for
131
described in detail by Judge Kollar-Kotelly of the
access”
McConnell district court. Her findings cited to handwritten notes by
party leaders, promising to facilitate meetings and to pass on policyrelated correspondence from donors to Members of the House and
132
Senate; she also cited to extensive details on party committee donor
benefit programs which provided increasing levels of access to federal
133
officeholders with higher donations.
Perhaps the most specific evidence on the influence arising from
soft money came from two members of the U.S. Senate. The Court
relied on testimony by former Senator Paul Simon, corroborated by
testimony by then-current Senator Russ Feingold, of a “good example
of [large contributors seeking legislative favors in exchange for their
contributions] which stands out . . . because it was so stark and recent
occurred on the next to last day of the 1995-96 legislative session”:
Federal Express wanted to amend a bill being considered by a
Conference Committee, to shift coverage of their truck drivers
from the National Labor Relations Act to the Railway Act, which
includes airlines, pilots and railroads. This was clearly of benefit to
Federal Express, which according to published reports had
contributed $1.4 million in the last 2 year cycle to incumbent
Members of Congress and almost $1 million in soft money to the
political parties. I opposed this in the Democratic Caucus, arguing
that even if it was good legislation, it should not be approved
without holding a hearing, we should not cave in to the special
interests. One of my senior colleagues got up and said, ‘I’m tired of
Paul always talking about special interests; we’ve got to pay

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id. (citing 251 F.Supp.2d at 492–506).
Id. at 151.
McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 500–01 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
Id. at 502–08.
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attention to who is buttering our bread.’ . . . This was a clear
example of donors getting their way, not on the merits of the
legislation, but just because they had been big contributors. I do
134
not think there is any question that this is the reason it passed.

In addition to Senator Simon’s specific recollection, the Court
cited less specific testimony from Senators John McCain and Alan
Simpson connecting soft-money contributions by the pharmaceutical
industry, trial lawyers associations, and tobacco companies to
135
“manipulations of the legislative calendar.”
It bears emphasis that the evidence of soft money’s actual
influence on congressional action was rather thin. There was little if
any evidence tying specific soft-money donations to specific
legislative decisions. There was, however, abundant evidence that big
soft-money contributions created conflicts of interest for legislators.
The record showed that reasonable legislators would feel pressure to
act in a particular way—even if they did not actually admit that their
votes had been or would be influenced.
2. State and local parties’ election activities create a significant risk
of actual and apparent corruption, as well as the risk of circumvention.
In addition to banning soft money contributions to national party
committees, BCRA required that state and local parties use only hard
136
money to fund federal election activity. An amendment to BCRA,
sponsored by and named for Senator Carl Levin, carved out an
exception allowing state and local party committees to pay for certain
federal election activities with a prescribed ratio of hard money and
137
soft money raised subject to a $10,000 annual per-person cap. Taken
together, the Court found that Congress had designed the provisions

134. Id. at 852 (Leon, J.); id. at 482 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
135. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150–51.
136. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(b)(1) (West 2003)
invalidated by McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The term “federal election activity”
includes four categories of activities: (1) voter registration within 120 days before a federal
election; (2) voter identification, GOTV, and other generic campaign activity conducted in
connection with an election in which a candidate for federal office appears on the ballot; (3) any
public communication that promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a clearly identified candidate
for federal office; and (4) the employment of a state party committee employee who spends
more than 25 percent of her time working on federal election activities. § 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv).
“Federal election activity” specifically does not include public communications and grassroots
materials that refer solely to nonfederal candidates, contributions to nonfederal candidates, and
state and local conventions. § 431(20)(B).
137. § 441i(b)(2). See also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 162–64 (discussing the Levin
Amendment).
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to “construct[ ] a coherent scheme of campaign finance regulation”
and, in particular, to prevent “wholesale evasion” of the ban on soft
138
money to national parties.
The first step in the Court’s analysis of the regulation of state and
local parties was its consideration of the governmental interest it
139
advanced. The Court found that Congress “both drew a conclusion”
140
and “made a prediction” through its restrictions on soft money. The
conclusion was that state and local parties “function as an alternative
141
avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces” present in soft
money contributions to national parties. The prediction was that, once
the flow of soft money to national parties stopped, state and local
parties would become the next outlet through which soft money
142
would creep into federal elections. Restrictions on state and local
parties served the same governmental interest in preventing
143
corruption as limits on national parties.
In assessing the asserted anti-corruption interest, the Court cited
the testimony of former Senator Warren B. Rudman that “much of
144
what state and local parties do helps to elect federal candidates,”
and that state parties would become the conduit for soft money in
145
federal elections without new restrictions. The Court also found
relevant federal candidates’ solicitation of donations to state parties
from those who had hit their limits for giving directly to the
146
campaign. It cited testimony by the RNC’s Chief Counsel that the
national party commonly redirected maxed contributors to state
parties, as well as a letter from Congressman Wayne Allard soliciting a
contribution for the Colorado Republican Party as a means of
“further help[ing his] campaign,” and expert testimony about
147
cooperation among state and local parties. According to the Court,
138. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161.
139. Id. at 164.
140. Id. at 165.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 164–66.
144. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 164 n.59 (quoting McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 467 (KollarKotelly, J.)).
145. Id. It is interesting to note that although Senator Rudman had left the Senate ten years
before testifying in McConnell, the Court clearly gave weight to both the descriptive and
predictive elements of his testimony.
146. Id. at 164.
147. Id. at 164 n.60 (quoting McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 479, and FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 458 (2001)). The citations were only examples
chosen from many available in the district court record. See also McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at
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there was “at least as much evidence as there was in Buckley that . . .
donations [made to state committees by federally maxed donors and
solicited by candidates and parties] have been made with the intent—
and in at least some cases the effect—of gaining influence over
148
federal officeholders.”
The evidence supporting restrictions on soft money to state and
local parties appears sparse because the McConnell Court implicitly
relied on its previous conclusion that soft-money contributions to
national parties have a corrupting influence. There was virtually no
evidence for Congress’s prediction that state parties would become
the new conduits for soft money absent further regulation. Instead,
the Court said that it owes “‘substantial deference to the predictive
judgments of Congress’s . . . particularly when, as here, those
predictions are firmly rooted in relevant history and common
149
sense,” and concluded preventing the circumvention of FECA
150
“clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest.” It gives no
indication what “relevant history” or “common sense” Congress could
rely on to support its anti-circumvention rationale beyond the “entire
151
history of campaign finance regulation.”
On the question of tailoring, the Plaintiffs made three arguments
for why the restrictions on state and local parties were not closely
drawn to the asserted governmental interest. First, they argued that
the restriction was overbroad in its sweep of state and local party
work that might influence a federal election. The Court disagreed
152
with regard to each category of “federal election activity,” noting
that “[c]ommon sense dictates, and it was ‘undisputed’ below that a
party’s efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly
153
assist the party’s candidates for federal office.” The Court also
154
observed that federal candidates “reap substantial rewards” from
any efforts to turn co-partisans out to vote, even if federal candidates
478–80 (citing to testimony of party officials and donors, documents showing solicitations from
incumbent Members of Congress for soft money donations to state parties).
148. Id. at 164–65. The evidence cited by the McConnell Court included examples from the
1998 Senate Government Affairs Committee report in which donations to state Democratic
committees were exchanged for access to and influence with federal officials. Id. at 165 n. 61.
149. Id. at 165 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)).
150. Id. at 165–66.
151. Id. at 165.
152. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv) (West
2003) invalidated by McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); see also supra note 136.
153. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 167 (citing 251 F.Supp.2d at 460).
154. Id. at 167–68.

STRAUSETOKAI 10.24.2014 (DO NOT DELETE)

204

12/20/2014 4:34 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 9:1

are not mentioned at either the registration or get-out-the-vote
155
(GOTV) stage. It cited an expert report regarding the effect of
generic campaign activity on federal candidates, the testimony by
representatives of the national congressional party committees that
they had transferred money to state and local parties for registration
and GOTV efforts that had a “significant effect on the election of
156
federal candidates,” and a letter from the California Democratic
Party thanking a contributor and noting that the state party’s voter
157
registration and GOTV efforts would help in federal elections.
The Plaintiffs’ second attack on the state and local party
restrictions was that the Levin Amendment’s restrictions placed an
158
unconstitutional burden on association among party committees.
The Court rejected the claim, finding the restrictions to be “justifiable
159
anticircumvention measures” designed to protect a “delicate and
160
Here, as with other antiinterconnected regulatory scheme.”
circumvention measures, there was little evidence specific to BCRA.
Instead, the McConnell Court cited the record in Buckley, specifically
the “intricate scheme” of American Milk Producers, Inc. to break up a
$2 million donation to the Nixon campaign into hundreds of small
contributions, as proof that donors could “readily circumvent” the
161
$10,000 limit on contributions to a state committee’s Levin account.
Finally, the McConnell plaintiffs contended that the restrictions on
state and local party committees would “prevent them from engaging
162
in effective advocacy.” The Court found the parties’ claims on this
155. Here the Court is addressing the first two categories of “federal election activity”—
voter registration and voter mobilization, specifically identification, get-out-the-vote, and other
generic party activities. See § 431(20)(A)(i)–(ii).
156. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 168 (citing McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 459–61).
157. Id. at 168 (citing McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 459). As for public communications by
state and local parties, the Court referenced its subsequent discussion of the direct effect on a
federal election of an advertisement that promotes or attacks a clearly identified candidate for
that election, saying that the “record on this score could scarcely be more abundant.” Id. at 170.
The final category, governing funds used to pay the salary of a state party employee who spends
more than 25 percent of her time on work in connection with a federal election, went essentially
unchallenged by the Plaintiffs, who failed to supply the Court with a reason to strike down the
provision. Id. at 171.
158. Id. at 171. The Levin Amendment prohibited (1) transfer of Levin funds (money
subject to the annual $10,000-per-person cap, but no other source or amount restrictions)
among state parties; (2) transfers of hard money to fund the portion of expenditures made
under the Amendment that must be made with hard dollars; and (3) joint fundraising of Levin
funds by state parties. Id. (discussing the Levin amendment, 26 U.S.C.A. § 323(b) (West 2014)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 172.
161. Id. at 171–72 & nn.65–66.
162. Id. at 173.
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point “speculative and not based on any analysis.” The evidence
consisted mostly of testimony by officials from California’s
Democratic and Republican Parties discussing the impact they
predicted BCRA would have on their organizations’ fundraising
164
efforts. Here again, the evidence from both sides was rather sparse,
and the Court gave the benefit of the doubt to those defending
Congress’ judgment.
3. Non-profit organizations could be used to circumvent the other
soft-money prohibitions.
In addition to limiting donations to party committees, BCRA also
restricted donations to and solicitations for non-profit organizations
165
that make expenditures in connection with federal elections. The
Government defended these restrictions as anti-circumvention
measures, designed to prevent the parties from “mobiliz[ing] their
formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access
to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt
166
organizations that conduct activities benefitting their candidates.”
The Court saw an overbreadth problem with a flat ban on party
donations to non-profits and construed the provision to allow parties
167
to give hard dollars they had raised subject to BCRA’s limitations,
but otherwise upheld the provision on the anti-circumvention
rationale.
The evidence cited by the Court in upholding the non-profit
restrictions supported two subsidiary factual findings: that activities of
non-profit organizations benefited federal candidates, and that party
committees solicited and donated money for these non-profits to

163. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 524 (2003)).
164. In the district court, Judge Kollar-Kotelly specifically noted that the state party
officials acknowledged they had not analyzed how the parties might change their fundraising
operations to adapt to BCRA or how much of the non-federal money previously donated to the
national parties would be redirected their way, and that the parties’ expert Prof. Raymond La
Raja concluded in his dissertation (discussed in his cross examination and included as an exhibit
thereto) that parties would adapt to new soft money restrictions, and that new rules would not
particularly hamper parties already similarly constrained under state law. McConnell, 251
F.Supp.2d at 524 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
165. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A. § 441i(d) (West 2003),
invalidated by McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The ban included organizations
established under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code as well as § 527 organizations “other
than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the
authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office.” Id.
166. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 175.
167. Id. at 180.
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support their federal electioneering. On the first, the Court offered
the activities of the NAACP’s National Voter Fund and of NARAL in
168
the run-up to the 2000 election as examples. These groups’ efforts
included direct mailings and phone calls responsible for “increased
169
turnout (over 1996 numbers) among target groups” in the case of
170
the NAACP and “mobiliz[ing] 2.1 million pro-choice voters” by
NARAL, as shown by evidence cited in an expert report and a
declaration by a NARAL official.
The Court’s second finding, that parties solicited money to
support the federal election activities of non-profits, reinforced the
first finding. It also provided the factual ground for the Court’s legal
conclusion that “Congress’ concerns about circumvention are not
171
merely hypothetical.” Here, the Court gave a brief descriptive
account of how parties aided in providing revenues to non-profits
before BCRA, taken from conclusions of both the majority and
172
minority in the 1998 Senate Report as well as findings of fact made
173
in the district court.
Although not discussed in depth by the Supreme Court, the
district court judges’ findings with regard to party relationships with
non-profits were extensive and relied on a considerable range of
174
evidence. For example, Judge Kollar-Kotelly relied on declarations
by two large Democratic donors describing their conversations with
party committees about which non-profits could make effective use of
175
their donations. One of the donors testified “that the national
Democratic Party played an important role in his decision to donate
soft money to ‘certain interest groups that were running effective ads
in the effort to elect Vice President Gore, such as NARAL. The
assumption was that the funds would be used for television ads or
some other activity that would make a difference in the Presidential

168. Id. at 175 n.68.
169. McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 522.
170. Id.
171. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176.
172. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 105-167 at 4013 (1998)) (“[I]n addition to direct contributions
from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for
many of the coalition’s nonprofit organizations . . . .”); id. (citing S. Rep. No. 105-167 at 5983
(1998) (Minority Views)) (“Tax-exempt ‘issue advocacy’ groups and other conduits were
systematically used to circumvent the federal campaign finance laws.”).
173. Id. at 176, 179.
174. See McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 517–20 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 848-50 (Leon, J.).
175. Judge Leon cited one of the declarations, along with a statement in the congressional
record by Senator John Glenn. Id. at 848.
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176

election.’” With regard to Republican Party committees, both Judges
Kollar-Kotelly and Leon cited documents showing donations made
177
directly by the party. Although the letters accompanying the
donations indicated the money was given in “recognition” of “efforts
178
to educate and inform the American public,” the district court
judges also cited a statement by then-National Republican Senatorial
Committee (NRSC) Chairman Phil Gramm to the Washington Post
that one of the donations was made “because [the NRSC] knew the
funds would be used on behalf of several specific Republican
179
candidates for the Senate,” painting the donations in more of a
federal election-oriented light.
Also significant was the rise of what the Supreme Court called
180
“politician 527 groups.” Similar to leadership PACs, these groups
were created by individual Members of Congress and caucuses
181
seeking to increase their influence within the legislature and parties.
The key difference, however, is that unlike leadership PACs, politician
527s were not subject to FECA’s source and amount limitations and
so were able to raise “substantial sums of soft money from corporate
182
interests, as well as from the national parties themselves.” The
district court findings on this point were primarily supported by
citations to a report by Public Citizen, an advocacy organization that
183
had lobbied in support of BCRA’s passage. Both district court
judges also relied on corroborating testimony by a major donor who
stated that he gave $500,000 to “Daschle Democrats,” a 527
organization that ran broadcast ads in South Dakota supporting
184
Senator Tom Daschle, but the primary source for describing the
flow of money through Member-centered 527s was the Public Citizen

176. Id. at 517 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
177. Id. at 517–18.
178. Id. (quoting Letter to Nat’l Right to Life from the Republican Nat’l State Elections
Comm., Oct. 18, 1996, with enclosed $500k donation; three letters to Americans for Tax Reform
from the Republican Nat’l State Elections Comm., dated in October 1996, accompanying three
donations totaling $3.6M from party committees).
179. Id. at 518.
180. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176.
181. See generally McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 519–20 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 849–50
(Leon, J.)
182. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 176.
183. McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 519–20 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 849–50 (Leon, J.)
(citing PUB. CITIZEN. CONG. WATCH, CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS’ SOFT MONEY ACCOUNTS
SHOW NEED FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM BILLS 10–11 (2002), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/527_march212002.PDF).
184. Id. at 519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id. at 850 (Leon, J. ).
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report.
4. The ban on corporate and labor electioneering communications
185
was neither overbroad nor underinclusive.
The McConnell Plaintiffs did not challenge the government’s
interest in banning electioneering communications funded from
corporate and union treasuries—the challenge that would later prove
successful in Citizens United. Instead, they asserted this corporate and
union electioneering ban was both overbroad and underinclusive. The
Supreme Court recognized that there was a dispute in the district
court over what percentage of “genuine” issue advertisements would
186
fall subject to the electioneering ban —a “battle of the experts”
waged over the analysis and conclusions in the Buying Time studies
187
produced by the Brennan Center for Justice in 1998 and 2000. These
controversial studies concluded that the vast majority of ads aired
during the ban’s thirty- and sixty-day “blackout periods” had an
188
electioneering purpose. The Court relied on the Annenberg Report,
the separate expert report by Krasno & Sorauf analyzing the same
data as the Buying Time studies utilized, and the factual findings of
Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon.
In determining that the electioneering communications ban was
not overbroad, Judge Kollar-Kotelly had found that most candidatecentered issue advocacy is concentrated in the weeks surrounding
189
federal elections, and cited an expert report analyzing scripts of
190
She found that “advertisements naming
issue advertisements.
federal candidates, targeted to their electorate, and aired in the period
191
before the election, influence voters,” citing testimony from political
consultants, admissions by the National Association of Builders, and
192
her own analysis of sixteen advertisements. Judge Leon likewise
185. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 203–09.
186. Id. at 206.
187. For access to these studies, see Buying Time Homepage, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/buying-time (last updated June 1, 2013).
188. KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, ANNENBERG PUB. POL’Y CTR., ISSUE ADVERTISING IN
1999-2000
ELECTION
CYCLE
(2001),
available
at
THE
http://cdn.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2001_19992000issueadvocacy2
.pdf.
189. McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 573 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
190. Id. at 561–63.
191. Id. at 573.
192. Id. at 573–75. Of the twenty-one advertisements proffered by the McConnell Plaintiffs
to demonstrate overbreadth, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that nine would not have been
affected by BCRA; four mentioned federal candidates in the context of discussing a past vote
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relied on his own reading of scripts of advertisements, as well as
194
expert testimony and statements by the RNC political director. He
cited the Buying Time study for the percentage of advertisements that
lacked the “magic words” but nonetheless focused on influencing
195
candidate elections.
As to the Plaintiffs’ claim that the electioneering communications
provision was underinclusive because it left print and internet
communications unregulated, the Supreme Court found that the
“records developed in . . . litigation and by the Senate Committee
adequately explain the reasons for this legislative choice,” specifically
that “corporations and unions used soft money to finance a virtual
torrent of televised election-related ads during the periods
immediately preceding federal elections[.]” The Court found
especially persuasive a six-volume 1998 report by the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs summarizing its “extensive
196
investigation into the campaign practices of the 1996 elections.” In
addition, the Court cited Judge Kollar-Kotelly’s finding that the
provision was properly tailored by addressing only those forms of
197
communication Congress found to be problematic. In reaching that
conclusion, she relied on expert testimony regarding the prevalence of
198
broadcast communications,
as confirmed by testimony from
witnesses involved in making the relevant advertisements, such as the
and were found not to be probative of BCRA’s overreach; and that the remaining eight could
not demonstrate overbreadth, even assuming it could be ascertained that they were truly not
intended to affect a federal election. Id. Judge Kollar-Kotelly also examined an additional fortythree advertisements, identified by her and by the Defendants as appearing in either the
Plaintiff’s briefs or in testimony and excluded twelve for lack of information about their air
dates; another thirteen because they did not mention a candidate for federal office; one by the
ACLU because it was “clearly designed simply to provide the corporation standing to challenge
BCRA” (per testimony and documents provided by the ACLU’s legislative director); and
another by the AFL-CIO as not probative. Id. at 575–76. With regard to the remaining
advertisements, Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not attempt to determine if their “true purpose was to
affect an election,” but rather concluded that the evidence provided was not sufficient to render
the electioneering provision overbroad and noted that “[i]f Plaintiffs were correct, that BCRA
would have such an indelible effect on their ability to advertise about issues of importance to
their organization, I would have expected a more robust showing[.]” Id. at 578.
193. Id. at 826–27 (Leon, J.).
194. Id. at 826.
195. Id. Judge Leon expressed reservations about the 1998 version but found Buying Time
2000 sound and persuasive.
196. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129.
197. McConnell, 251 F.Supp.2d at 569 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). The Court also cited to Judge
Leon’s findings as to whether the provision was underinclusive, e.g. McConnell, 540 U.S. 93,
148–50, but Judge Leon simply agreed with the findings of Judge Kollar-Kotelly. Id. at 799
(Leon, J.).
198. Id. at 569–70 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.).
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AFL-CIO President’s Special Assistant for Public Affairs and other
199
political consultants.
What lessons can be drawn from this review of the McConnell
record? A close examination reveals scant evidence that either soft
money or electioneering communications altered actions by Members
of Congress. In other words, the evidence of actual influence was very
thin. There was some evidence that soft money helped secure—and
was intended to help secure—access to Members of Congress. But the
record demonstrated something more than mere access. Taken as a
whole, the McConnell record showed that soft money would cause a
reasonable legislator to feel pressure to act in a particular way. It
documented rampant conflicts of interest arising from soft money—
specifically, between legislators’ incentive to serve big soft-money
donors on the one hand, and their obligation to serve the interest of
their constituents and the public on the other. While much of the
evidence was ostensibly directed at showing that BCRA’s restrictions
were appropriately tailored, it also helped show the existence of an
important governmental interest beyond quid pro quo corruption.
Justice Breyer emphasized this point in his McCutcheon dissent,
highlighting the ample evidence of “privileged access to and the
pernicious influence upon elected representatives” documented in the
200
McConnell record. This record painted a vivid picture of a Congress
besieged by conflicts of interest. That was the forest that the
McConnell Court saw through the trees of the voluminous record
compiled in the district court. Of course, evidence of disparate access
and influence is irrelevant to the Roberts Court, given its narrow
definition of corruption as quid pro quo. Such evidence is, however,
relevant to four justices on the current Court—and may someday be
relevant to the majority of a future Court. We now turn to the
development of a record for such a court.
IV. A RECORD FOR THE NEXT COURT
As any good lawyer knows, telling a good story is more important
to success in a courtroom than mastery of legal doctrine. In
McConnell, BCRA’s supporters were able to tell a persuasive story of
a campaign finance system rife with conflicts of interest. That story
remains central to the debate over campaign finance regulation, even
199. Id. at 570–73.
200. McConnell, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1469 (2014) (Breyer, J. dissenting in part).
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though it is irrelevant to five justices on the current Court. Justice
Breyer’s McCutcheon dissent underlines the importance of attending
to the political realities of money’s impact on the legislative process.
At the same time, his dissent implicitly highlights a more subtle point.
The evidence cited by Justice Breyer is more than a decade old. The
ecology of money and influence that existed before BCRA is not the
same ecology that exists today. Some of the same problems may still
exist, to be sure, but the McConnell record tells us little or nothing
about the current reality. Justice Breyer’s dissent thus suggests the
need to update that record to document the realities of the current
system of campaign finance.
Any future reforms to the campaign finance landscape will
demand a record-building effort at least equal to that engaged in for
the McConnell litigation. In particular, a thorough evidentiary record
will be critical in shaping the next generation of campaign financing
reforms and defending them in court. We appreciate the intellectual
energy devoted to articulating a rationale beyond quid pro quo for a
future Court to use and agree with Professor Hasen’s call for scholars
to “do more work defining and defending governmental interests that
201
justify reasonable . . . campaign finance regulations.” But defining
these interests is not the same as developing a record to document
problems in the current system. Regardless of whether a future
Supreme Court is more inclined to adopt a rationale founded in anti202
corruption (a la Lowenstein, Teachout, and Lessig have argued ) or
203
equality (a la Strauss, Cain, and Hasen ), it will need an updated
evidentiary record to shape and defend the next generation of reform.
Even if a future Court is less hostile to reform than the current one, as
we hope it will be, that Court is unlikely to rubber-stamp restrictions
on campaign expenditures or contributions. Rather, it will demand
documentation of both the reasons for regulation and its tailoring.
It would be far better if the development of this record began well
in advance of litigation being filed and even before legislation is
proposed. At the front end, crafting the next generation of reforms
will require empirical research, qualitative as well as quantitative,
about the harms to be addressed and the likely consequences of the
proposed change. Rather than deciding on a preferred theory of
201. Richard L. Hasen, Three Wrong Progressive Approaches (and One Right One) to
Campaign Finance Reform, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 33 (2014).
202. See supra notes 61–74 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 75–105 and accompanying text.
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regulation and designing a legislative approach to fit that theory,
policymakers should tailor reforms to the problems that are
documented by empirical researchers. This information will also be
essential at the back end, in demonstrating that regulations address
real-life problems and are appropriately drawn.
Academics and advocates would therefore be well-advised to
begin developing their evidentiary record now, rather than waiting
until a more reform-friendly Court is in place. The story that we
believe future reformers should try to tell—both for legislative bodies
and for courts—is one of pervasive conflicts of interest. That is
something more than mere access but less than actual influence. We
first explain why this should be regarded as an urgent priority. Next
we explain why research should focus on conflicts of interest in
election law, regardless of whether one favors an equality or anticorruption rationale for regulation. Finally, we sketch out what types
of evidence a record for the next Court might consist of.
A. Why Worry about the Record Now?
A robust and thorough record of the role of money in our political
process matters at the legislative stage and at the litigation stage, as
the story of BCRA demonstrates. Although the legislative record
directly relating to BCRA was thin, the law was drafted in the wake
of an extensive investigation by the Senate Government Affairs
204
Committee (Thompson Committee). The Committee’s inquiry
included three months of hearings and resulted in a published report
totaling more than 9,000 pages. Both the McConnell district court and
Supreme Court cited repeatedly to the Thompson Committee’s
findings, including for inquiries into the purpose of BCRA, enacted
four years after the investigation was complete.
Following the Thompson Committee report, legislation that would
eventually become BCRA was debated in three different Congresses,
across five years, before the final version passed both chambers in
early 2002. During those debates, Members of Congress spoke on the
record about the role that soft money played in elections and in
influencing the legislative process, with varying degrees of specificity.
In addition to committee testimony given as BCRA moved through
the legislative process, Congress also relied on studies by the
204. The Thompson Committee report was issued to the United States Senate as S. REP.
NO. 105-167 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105srpt167/pdf/CRPT105srpt167-pt6.pdf.
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Annenberg Center and by the Brennan Center for Justice about the
205
nature of so-called “sham issue ads.”
The story of BCRA spans multiple investigations by congressional
Committees, large-scale studies by advocacy and academic
organizations, and lengthy statements by Members of Congress that,
perhaps because of the subject matter of the debates and legislation,
the courts treated as testimony about hard facts in the real world of
politics, rather than simply statements of legislative purpose or
information about predictive judgments by the legislature.
The first lesson from this history is that much of the burden for
amassing the next record will have to be borne by academics and
advocates. It appears unlikely, given the polarization of Congress and
the widely-noted weakness of the FEC, that neither will develop a
robust record on their own. For the next wave of changes to the
campaign finance system, the burden of producing the information
needed to legislate should be assumed to be on groups outside of
Congress. Undoubtedly any new campaign finance regulation
Congress crafts will soon thereafter be reviewed by the Supreme
Court, which will be faced with the task of reviewing the evidence
amassed in the legislation’s favor. The strength of the evidence
required will depend in part on which side of the divide the legislation
falls. As Professor Hasen has pointed out, Citizens United “shows the
Court’s apparent strategy: keep the evidentiary standard on proving
corruption low and the definition of corruption loose” for
contribution limitations “but keep the evidentiary standard
impossibly high and the definition of corruption extremely narrow
when it comes to considering the constitutionality of spending
206
limitations.” Hasen argues that this “evidentiary stacking-the-deck”
allows the Court to avoid confronting the more challenging question
of whether expenditure limits might in fact pass strict scrutiny with a
207
broader conception of corruption. Policymakers and litigators
should be prepared to meet the formidable evidentiary burdens
growing out of almost four decades of constitutional precedent.
The second lesson is that persuading the next Court to adopt a
new rationale for regulation will require a substantial body of
evidence. As the Court stated in Shrink Missouri, the “quantum of
205. See supra notes 187–188 and accompanying text.
206. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV.
581, 617 (2011); see also Briffault, supra note 109, at 165–66.
207. Hasen, supra note 206, at 617.
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empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of
legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and
208
plausibility of the justification raised.” Accordingly, legislation that
seeks to combat quid pro quo corruption or its appearance will not
bear a heavy burden. But if it seeks to advance a new rationale for
regulation, advocates of reform can expect to face an especially heavy
evidentiary burden. That is true whether they ground their arguments
in dependence corruption, equality, or both. It is obvious that an
egalitarian rationale will bear a heavy burden. Advocates will have to
produce evidence of inequality to overcome the Court’s precedent
since Buckley finding the concept “wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.” Yet the burden on those who favor a dependence
corruption rationale is not much lighter. Despite Professor Lessig’s
argument that it is demanded by an originalist view of the
Constitution, its debut will have to be grounded on something more
than theory and history. It will require a substantial body of evidence
that dependence corruption is really a problem.
The third lesson to be drawn from past litigation is the wide
variety of evidence considered by the Court. That includes qualitative
empirical research, as well as quantitative work. Important to nearly
all points were on-the-record statements by key players in the
political process. These included not only Members of Congress and
party officials, but also political consultants and campaign operatives,
as well as large individual donors and PAC and corporate heads. Also
crucial was the documentary evidence—some of which would only
come through discovery (internal memos and emails, hand-written
notes from Members of Congress thanking donors) but many were
publicly available and, in the age of the internet, their contemporary
corollaries may be readily obtainable today. McConnell also highlights
the importance of social science research, and even of research done
by organizations with a particular agenda, provided that work is
methodologically sound.
A strong record is essential both to document the interests served
by legislation, and to show that it is appropriately tailored. Too often,
the tailoring prong is glossed over in academic discussions of
209
campaign finance, yet it is critical to the Court’s evaluation of
210
regulation. For all of the evidence the Court sifted through in
208. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000).
209. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 66, at 69 n.33.
210. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 166–74 (indicating that once the Court accepts the undue
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McConnell to determine whether particular provisions were tailored
appropriately, much of it was amassed in the course of litigation. We
think that evidence of appropriate tailoring should be a part of the
discussion from the beginning, not simply gathered in support of
arguments made to the courts. Up front examination of the problems
that exist in the real world is likely to be more persuasive to a court
than post hoc studies, which may appear ginned up to reach a desired
result. While the McConnell Court gave considerable deference to
211
Congress’s “predictive judgments,” it is less likely to defer to such
judgments about the interests served by regulation or its tailoring.
This article has deliberately eschewed discussion of the contours that
future reforms should take, because we believe that those should be
firmly rooted in evidence of the problems created by the flow of
money into politics.
B. Why Focus on Conflicts of Interests?
We think that academics and advocates seeking to lay the
groundwork for the next generation of reform should focus their
attention on conflicts of interest arising from money in politics. As our
title indicates, this is something more than a showing of mere access,
but less than actual influence. Thus, for example, evidence that those
making independent expenditures enjoy disproportionate access
would not be enough. On the other hand, supporters of reform would
not be required to show that independent expenditures actually
changed anyone’s vote. They would, however, be required to show
conflicts of interest—that a reasonable legislator would feel pressure
to act in way that is different from the preferences of her constituents
and the public interest.
We think that the evidentiary record should focus on conflicts of
interest, regardless of whether one is more inclined toward a
dependence corruption or egalitarian theory of reform. As Professor
Lowenstein noted, a conflict of interest can exist regardless of
whether there is a moment behind closed doors—or simply inside a
legislator’s own head—in which the decision is made to succumb to
212
the wishes of a donor. Because it does not require inquiry into the
hidden moment of potentially improper decision-making, evidence of
influence anti-corruption rationale at the beginning, every other provision is examined for
tailoring questions).
211. Id. at 165.
212. See Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 83, at 326.
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conflict of interest will likely be easier to amass. The evidence is both
more likely to be out in the open and less likely to require admitting
to any bad intent by contributors or weakness by legislators.
Again, we do not deny that there are significant differences
between dependence corruption and egalitarian theories of campaign
finance regulation. Nor do we deny that there may be some
differences at the margins of what sort of evidence proponents of
these views might try to develop. But we do not think it necessary to
become enmeshed in—or, worse still, consumed by—this theoretical
argument at the evidence-gathering stage. In fact, we think that this
conflict can easily and productively be sidestepped. The search for
conflicts of interest is necessarily an objective one: it asks whether a
particular incarnation of campaign money (be it in the form of
contributions to a candidate or to a leadership PAC, or direct
spending through another entity) would cause a reasonable legislator
to feel pressure to act in way that is different from the preferences of
her constituents and the public interest. The inquiry centers around
examining the effects of campaign spending, rather than the purpose
behind that spending. It also avoids the problem inherent in trying to
measure the actual effects of spending and donations. A conflicts of
interest approach does not require one to believe that money
“corrupts” the legislative process or that it results in policymaking
213
that departs from some theoretically “pure” baseline. The question,
again, is whether it creates an incentive for legislators to act in a way
that is different from the preferences of their constituents or the
public interest. It may also suggest reforms that respect First
Amendment concerns while still mitigating harms to the democratic
process that might result from the current ecology of campaign
finance regulation. For example, a legislative body concerned with
conflicts of interest may consider changing internal rules to include
disclosure and walling-off rules such as those used by law firms or the
214
requirements of corporate directors.

213. By contrast, a search for evidence that fits within an equality rationale framework, for
example, first requires setting an “equal” baseline. Evidence developed to fit an “undue
influence” or other corruption-based rationale necessitates an “uncorrupted” baseline.
214. See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 217, 231–33 (2010) (suggesting a system of “legislative recusal” for winning candidates
whose campaigns have benefited from especially large expenditures, enforceable not by the
judiciary but as an ethic required of legislators by the voters). See also, Eugene Mazo, The
Disappearance of Corruption and the New Path Forward in Campaign Finance, 9 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. (forthcoming 2014).
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But conflicts of interest cannot merely be assumed. They must
actually be proven. In the next section, we consider the types of
evidence that those seeking to document conflicts of interest arising
from campaign money might look to.
C. What Should the Evidence Look Like?
If the extensive McConnell record shows anything, it is that
Congress and the courts will need information from a plethora of
sources in order to reach the kinds of legal conclusions that the
academics debating over the best rationale would have them make.
Taking guidance from both the academic literature in Part III and our
canvass of the McConnell record in Part IV, we offer the following
suggestions of what evidence might be developed by researchers.
Member statements: The Court’s consideration of the McConnell
record shows that testimony by current and former Members of
Congress is important for both their general descriptions of the role
of money in politics and for specific examples of their own
experiences. An update of McConnell’s record, to document conflicts
of interest in the current system, is now in order. Qualitative
researchers should interview current and recently retired or defeated
Members about what effect, if any, non-party independent spending
has on the legislative process. For example, research focused on
illuminating conflicts of interest might ask how aware Members are of
non-party independent spenders active in their own races; whether
they have ever received threats of oppositional spending or promises
of favorable spending (either direct or implied) in connection with
particular legislative action; whether independent spending is
considered as a factor in deciding on various legislative actions such
as introducing bills, making statements or asking questions in
committees, or expressing support more or less publicly for a
particular issue.
It is important, however, that researchers do not limit their
universe of interview subjects to Members of Congress favorable to
campaign finance reform efforts. As Bob Bauer has written, the
“acknowledged experts” in campaign finance debates are those
“politicians who are convinced that money accounts for certain
215
legislative behavior, and who have solutions to offer.” Regardless of
215. Bob Bauer, What To Do About The Court: Two Views, MORE SOFT MONEY HARD
LAW (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com/2013/10/what-to-do-about-thecourt-two-views/.
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whether one agrees with this assessment to date, it should serve as a
note of caution to avoid the bias that can come with looking for
evidence to fit a pre-determined rationale or regulatory proposal.
Even for reform-minded scholars, the goal of research should be an
accurate description of the political world as it is, not simply as it is
assumed to be.
Statements by other political actors: In addition to Member
statements, the McConnell record reveals the importance of
interviews with candidates, campaign consultants, and donors. To this
group, we would also add congressional staff. Members’ staff—both
from campaigns and from official offices—can provide more detailed
information about the ongoing relationships with and lobbying efforts
by individuals and organizations engaged in independent spending.
Staff might also be asked about the timing of fundraisers to coincide
with legislative action—for example, where a committee holds a
hearing on a particular subject and a Member of that committee holds
a fundraiser with stakeholders shortly before or after the hearing, how
might internal office practices such as Member briefing and staff
assignments either separate or elide the hearing and fundraiser?
Researchers might also inquire as to whether campaigns are aware of
the identities of contributors to supportive non-party independent
spending organizations and whether information of such “soft money”
contributions to outside groups is passed on to the candidate or
Member. Interviews with donors and consultants for independent
spending groups might follow along the same lines, asking whether
they discuss legislative agendas with Members in the context of
fundraisers, whether they receive notes of thanks from Members for
their contributions to outside groups, and the outside group and
donor perspective of Member perception of their efforts.
Empirical research: On the empirical front, future legislators and
courts concerned with conflicts of interest would benefit from analysis
of the timing of legislative decisions and public statements and
fundraising materials of independent spending groups, as well as
survey research of Members of Congress. For example, research might
ask whether there is ever a correlation between independent
spending targeted at a Member and legislative action taken by that
Member, such as signing on to a bill as a co-sponsor or proposing an
amendment in committee. Similarly, surveys might also examine
whether independent spending activated a Member’s constituents and
caused them to contact their representative’s office or campaign,
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perhaps indicating where constituent support or opposition played a
mediating role between the outside group and the Member’s
legislative decision.
One type of evidence that was especially persuasive to the courts
in McConnell was documentary evidence of fundraising practices such
as solicitation letters, thank you letters, and fundraising “menus”
describing the events with Members of Congress available at certain
levels of giving. Without the help of discovery rules available to
litigants, academic researchers may have difficulty amassing similar
documentary evidence. However, to the extent that such information
is available publicly, it should be retained and cataloged for possible
analysis. Potential research questions might include whether
independent spending groups advertise access to Members of
Congress to their donors, how outside groups describe their impact on
the legislative process, and whether Members indicate—either
through direct appreciation or other public statements—knowledge
of efforts by independent spending organizations’ efforts and
agendas.
Additionally, scholars studying Congress should look to the work
of Professor Lynda W. Powell on the influence of money in state
216
legislatures for models of survey research on this topic. Her
extensive survey of state legislators investigated the extent to which
campaign contributions influence the legislative process, looking
beyond the usual measure of money-for-votes to a far richer
conception of legislative output. Professor. Powell’s investigation
considered both institutional features such as term limits and size, as
well as members’ individual decisions about how much time to spend
fundraising. To the extent that similar research can be done about
Congress and ask about not only direct contributions but outside
spending as well—especially in its look beyond the final roll call votes
to myriad of other points at which money might influence the
legislative process and focus on the experience of legislators
themselves—it would provide an important contribution to the
courts’ understanding of the world of campaign finance. However, the
responsibility for producing rigorous research here does not fall solely
on the shoulders of academics—Members of Congress must be willing
to participate. Leadership of both parties should encourage their
216. E.g. LYNDA W. POWELL, THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE
LEGISLATURES (2013); Lynda W. Powell, The Invluence of Campaign Contributions on the
Legislative Process, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 75 (2014).
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rank-and-file to respond to academic surveys. Organizations such as
the American Political Science Association should develop
relationships with congressional Member and staff organizations
willing to assist researchers.
Press reports: Finally, the McConnell record and Professor
Lowenstein’s work should serve as reminders of the important role of
journalists in building a record to inform legislative and litigation
efforts, as well as the academic debates over rationales for regulation.
Lowenstein noted that press reports of linking legislative actions on
matters of interest to contributors and contributions are often
belittled as anecdotal and unimportant, but because conflicts of
interest are not about looking for a “smoking gun,” the press accounts
can offer useful descriptions of the “complexity and the ambiguities in
217
the process.” As an example, Lowenstein offers articles in the Wall
Street Journal by Brooks Jackson and Jeffrey Birnbaum about efforts
by Rep. Bob Matsui to repeal a tax provision favored by public utility
218
companies. The articles include statements by both Matsui and
lobbyists for the utility companies about how the companies used
money (in the form of contributions and now-illegal honoraria) to
influence legislators, as well as details about a Member who had cosponsored the bill and then had his name removed from the
219
legislation after receiving the money. It may be that reporters are in
the best position to discover and describe the “complexity and
ambiguities” that give rise to conflicts of interest in the first place, and
researchers should look to journalists’ investigative work for starting
points to dig deeper into the political process as it is, not as a
theoretician might imagine it to be.
CONCLUSION
Development of an evidentiary record supporting the next
generation of campaign finance reforms should begin now. Important
as the academic debate over theories of reform may be, it should not
forestall qualitative and quantitative empirical research on our
current system. In fact, there is common ground that conflicts of
interest are problematic, among those on both the dependence
corruption and equality sides of the theoretical debate. We therefore
argue that the primary focus of such research should be on
217. Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform, supra note 81, at 333–34.
218. Id. at 330–33.
219. Id.
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documenting conflicts of interest arising from the flow of campaign
money into our system—something more than a showing of access,
but less than actual influence. Such research will be essential both in
crafting appropriate legislation and in defending it in court. To be
clear, we are under no illusions about the current Supreme Court, a
majority of whose members are hostile to campaign finance
regulation. No quantum of evidence will persuade them to change
their minds. But the current Court will not sit forever. Academics,
advocates, policymakers, and lawyers should not wait until a more
sympathetic Court is in place before beginning the essential work of
documenting conflicts of interest in our current system of campaign
finance.

